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Introduction
In 2012, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) suf-
fered a  setback with a  failed consensus over the  South China Sea at 
the first ASEAN Summit in April 2012 and at the ASEAN-Post Minis-
terial Meeting., when Cambodia, acting in favour of Chinese interests, 
unilaterally blocked the Philippines demand to include the South China 
Sea issue in the Chairman‘s Statement. Already before the Summit, com-
mentators warned of the possibility that China might exercise its influ-
ence over Cambodia, ASEAN’s chair in 2012, to prevent the emergence of 
a common ASEAN stance on the South China Sea dispute
Emmerson (2012) stressed the symbolic damage caused by Cambodia 
by the failure of Hun Sen’s government to even try to agree on disagreeing, 
an important norm of ASEAN’S consensus driven processes and the ASE-
AN Way. This paper argues that the negative symbolic effect on ASEAN 
identity should not be underestimated. The ASEAN (Cambodia’s) chair‘s 
unwillingness to maintain such consensus led many in the association to 
question the sincerity of Cambodia‘s commitment.
The thesis presented here is that China‘s lobbying on Cambodia pre-
sents a new threat to ASEAN by  frustrating ASEAN’s consensus build-
ing-process. Using Social Identity Theory (SIT), this paper will analyse 
the significance of the failed consensus from an Indonesian perspective. 
This paper draws on quantitative and qualitative data gathered during 
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two research trips to Indonesia. The first trip was conducted in June and 
July 2010 and hosted by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) in Jakarta; the second trip from October 2012 until March 2013 
was hosted by  Universitas Katolik Parahyangan (UNPAR) in Bandung. 
The datasets include in-depth interviews with Indonesian diplomats, par-
liamentarians and foreign-policy advisers as well as a quantitative survey 
on foreign policy attitudes. After presenting the  theoretical framework 
based on SIT, the paper will analyse the quantitative (survey) and qualita-
tive (interviews) datasets for evidence on the perception of a threat posed 
by China to Indonesia‘s social identity as a member, and self-perceived 
leader, of ASEAN. The final section will discuss the results and answer if 
such a new threat perception exists in Indonesia.
Social Identity Theory
Social Identity Theory holds that an individual‘s identity is not solely 
determined by that individual’s personal characteristics and relations to 
other individuals, but also by  a  person‘s membership in groups (social 
identity) (Giessner and van Knippenberg, 2008: 15). In international re-
lations, SIT positsthat the identification with particular groups has im-
plications for an actor’s self-image (Tajfel, 1969), because “people strive 
to achieve or maintain a positive social identity […]” (Brown, 2000: 747). 
Group membership is primarily motivated by an individual’s desire for 
self evaluation as well as by  self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 47; 
Turner, 1982) and self-enhancement (Tajfel, 1972: 438).
Three variables affect intergroup differentiation according to SIT: 
“people must be subjectively identified with their ingroup; the situation 
should permit evaluative intergroup comparisons; the outgroup must be 
sufficiently comparable (e.g. similar or proximal) and that pressures for 
distinctiveness should increase with comparability” (Tajfel and Turner, 
1986: 13). Previous research suggested three determinants of an in-group’s 
psychological utility: the in-group’s perceived value, its self-relevance, and 
its entitativity (Correll and Park, 2005: 346). A social group’s perceived 
value changes depending on the  evaluation and re-evaluation by mem-
bers influenced by their particular motives and perception of the group’s 
overall influence and strength. Five elements were identified as especial-
ly important for self-evaluation: a group’s merit, power, reputation and 
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(distinctive) consensus as well as the  (meaningful) belonging generated 
by membership. (Correll and Park, 2005: 347–349.)
Voci (2006) argued that a threat to social identity would trigger a threat 
evaluation in intergroup relations, because such a threat would threaten 
the in-group‘s values, distinctiveness and directly target the group mem-
bers’self-image. The felt intensity of the threat would vary depending on 
the  individual degrees of identification. Members strongly identifying 
with their group will be inclined to defend it, thereby, protecting their 
self-image. (Ibid: 265–284). Social identity in terms of SIT however, is 
context dependent and the  intensity of the  in-group members‘reaction 
varies based on the importance of the threatened object, such as a value, 
and between members of the threatened group depending on their individ-
ual degrees of identification. (Atran and Axelrod, 2008; Bazerman, Ten-
brunsel and Wade-Benzoni, 2008). If a state is unsatisfied with its social 
identity, it can adopt one of three strategies to improve its social identity: 
1) social mobility (leaving a group for and/or becoming a member in an-
other more prestigious group: exit option), 2) social dominance (actively 
aspiring leadership of a group: dominance option) or 3) social creativity 
(improving a group‘s status by investing creatively into the group: creativ-
ity option). (Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish andHodge, 1996.)
Analysis
The data comprises a total of 34 interviews and focus group discus-
sions accumulated during both trips as well as quantitative data from an 
online survey (N = 236; about 60,3% male and 39,7% female; one partic-
ipant did not disclose gender) conducted during the second trip. The sur-
vey includes 109 items: 108 of these had to be answered on a Likert scale 
(5 point scale: strongly disagree, disagree, neither disagree nor agree, agree 
and strongly agree, plus the option to refuse answering the question) while 
another item was a simple multiple choice question. Overall the survey 
sums up to 158 variables. Correlations were made using Pearson and 
probability was checked with confidence intervals and p-values.
The majority of survey participants (72,8%) were students, while In-
donesian academics and IR practitioners comprised the  remainder. At 
the time of questioning, 76% held or pursued a degree in IR. The online 
survey is, therefore, not representative for the whole population, but rather 
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for those groups of Indonesian society involved in foreign policy making 
and students from those universities with the best IR degree programmes, 
an important recruiting pool for government institutions in the IR and in 
the NGO field. The survey data is biased in two ways. Firstly, an over-pro-
portionate amount of participants aged 25 or younger (81,62%) which is 
due to the  large number of student participants. Secondly, an overrep-
resentation of Christians (47,75% total: 28,35% Catholics and 19,37% 
Protestants; 40,45% Muslims; 11,8% other religions) in a country with 
a Muslim population of about 88% (German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2013), which can be explained by the fact that many participants were en-
rolled at a Catholic university, which attracts a larger proportion of Chris-
tian students. Because the participants of this survey are largely students 
from Indonesia‘s major universities in the IR field, they offer an interest-
ing comparison to the qualitative interviews which focus on foreign policy 
elites. The  comparison of attitudes allows for observations on whether 
change in Indonesian world views occurs between the current and future 
generation of the IR elite.
Quantitative Data and Hypotheses
This paper began by arguing that three factors are central to the threat 
perception that China will split the ASEAN (China threat): 1) Indonesia‘s 
strong identification with ASEAN (ASEAN identity), 2) the perception of 
Indonesia‘s leadership role in the region (Indonesian leadership) and 3) 
the  focus of ASEAN in Indonesian foreign policy. Assuming a  link be-
tween ASEAN identity and Indonesian leadership, these factors should 
be mutually reinforcing, and together should aggravate the perception of 
China threat. Therefore, our three core hypothesis should be:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Strong identification with Indonesia’s regional 
leadership, results in high identification with ASEAN.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): High ASEAN identification, increases the threat 
perception that China will split ASEAN.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): High perception of Indonesia’s regional leader-
ship role, increases the threat perception that China will split ASEAN.
At the same time, the perception of the China threat should inten-
sify if trust in China is low and if Indonesia’s foreign policy is perceived 
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as lacking assertiveness in dealing with external challenges (e.g. China’s 
rise), an frequently expressed criticism.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Low trust in the Chinese government, increases 
the threat perception that China will split ASEAN.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The perception of a lack of assertiveness in Indo-
nesian foreign policy, increases the threat perception of China.
Due to ASEAN‘s focal position in Indonesian foreign policy, low iden-
tification with ASEAN and increasing threat perceptions of China should 
support the view that Indonesia is in need of a post-ASEAN foreign policy 
(the exit option) and should result in greater tendencies to challenge tra-
ditional foreign policy thinking in Indonesia.
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Low identification with ASEAN causes greater 
approval for a post-ASEAN foreign policy.
Hypothesis 7 (H7): High threat perception that China will split ASE-
AN causes greater approval for a post-ASEAN foreign policy.
Hypothesis 8 (H8): High threat perception that China will split ASE-
AN causes increasing rejection of traditional foreign policy concepts in 
Indonesia.
Data Analysis
Figure 1 on table 1 illustrates the five currently most discussed for-
eign policy issues in Indonesia, among which “China’s rise and military 
modernisation”was nominally ranked the lowest. “The rise of China” also 
ranks nominally the lowest among the greatest challenges to Indonesia’s 
own rise (figure 2 on table 2). It must be emphasised that these rankings 
are only nominally the  lowest and still received majority agreement on 
the suggestion that China is an important foreign policy issue. Overall, 
China ranks as the second biggest threat to Indonesia, behind Malaysia 
and followed by the US, out of 17 important global, regional and emerg-
ing powers (selection on table 3). All these items correlate strongly with 
the perception of China as a threat (table 3). Hence, the data generally in-
dicates a possible relationship between threat perception and e.g. the prox-
imity and perceived might of these countries as well as the influences of 
historical factors.
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ASEAN identity and Indonesian leadership
H1 predicts a relationship between the perception of an Indonesian 
leadership role in ASEAN and high identification with the  association. 
The data (table 4) suggests a positive relationship between ASEAN iden-
tity and the perception of an Indonesian leadership role as exemplified 
by the positive correlation between the main variables I (ASEAN member 
states share a  common identity [further used as ASEAN identity]) and 
II (Indonesia is the leader of ASEAN [further used as Indonesian leader-
ship]). H1 is also supported by similar correlations between Indonesian 
leadership and other identity variables (for example variable VII and VIII 
on table no 4). This is also represented in the high correlation between 
the perception of Indonesia’s ability to represent ASEAN on the  global 
level with ASEAN identity and Indonesian leadership (correlations with 
IV on table 4). However, some items on identification with ASEAN show 
different results when correlated with ASEAN identity and Indonesian 
leadership. Variable III (table no 4) has a  very strong negative correla-
tion with ASEAN identity, but a  significant correlation in the  different 
direction with Indonesian leadership (hence not supporting H1). Again 
the variables VI and X, both challenging ASEAN’s cohesion and ability 
to manage the regional order, show a similar tendency. These variables 
correlate negatively with ASEAN identity, but positively with Indonesian 
leadership. These two later cases, however, do not refute H1. Instead they 
support the assumption that ASEAN identity and Indonesian leadership 
were positively valued despite ASEAN‘s shortcomings in its internal co-
hesion and possibilities of bottom-up participation. Accordingly, the data 
(compare table 4) overall supports H1‘s prediction of a strong relationship 
between Indonesian leadership and ASEAN identity.
ASEAN identity and threat perception
H2 assumes a  link between ASEAN identity and the  perception of 
a Chinese threat to ASEAN ([further used as China threat]). As table 5 
shows the survey data does not support H2, because high ASEAN iden-
tity results in a low China threat (V and VI with I) and a generally lower 
perception that ASEAN-led multilateralism is dominated by great powers 
(I with IV). Contrary to H2, lower ASEAN identity increases China threat 
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(IV and V in correlation with II and III). The data suggests that the level of 
identification with ASEAN is less important regarding the perception that 
China‘s influence could split ASEAN, while ASEAN identity was more 
influential regarding the  perception of a  Chinese threat to Indonesia‘s 
role as a  regional leader. Overall, the  data could imply that the  extent 
of ASEAN’s perceived entitativity is more important regarding the threat 
perception.
However, looking on the data presented on table 6 it can be argued 
that H2 cannot be completely rejected. The data shows strong support for 
the view that ASEAN is crucial to regional stability and order and the re-
sponding variable (II) correlates strongly with ASEAN identity. Simultane-
ously, the perception of ASEAN as a talk-shop (I) correlates significantly 
with ASEAN‘s perceived lack of power vis-á-vis the European Union (III). 
Similar to table no 5, these items produce strong negative correlations 
with ASEAN identity, suggesting that weak identity results in the percep-
tion of ASEAN as generally weaker. Similar observations can be made 
regarding the ASEAN Community (AC) project‘s importance to ASEAN. 
Weak ASEAN identity resulted in negative perception of the AC‘s impor-
tance, while positive perception correlated strongly with ASEAN identity; 
the exception here is the comparison to the EU.
Table no 6 shows a similar patter regarding threat perceptions as table 
5 by  splitting the participants into two main groups. Those suspecting 
that Chinese influence would possibly split ASEAN (IV on table no 6) 
were equally strong in their perception of ASEAN as a talk-shop and lack-
ing power in comparison to the EU (I and III). The perception of China 
as a challenger to Indonesia’s role as a regional leader (V), however, corre-
lated more strongly with the perception of ASEAN as crucial for regional 
stability and order (II). Table no 6 suggests that the influence of ASEAN 
identity on the threat perception appears most important in relation to 
positive evaluations of ASEAN (II) and Indonesian leadership (VI and VII). 
In summary it can be argued that the survey does not completely support 
H2‘s prediction of a link between ASEAN identity and the perception of 
a Chinese threat to ASEAN. Rather, it indicates that there are two dif-
ferent threat perceptions. Firstly, that of a direct Chinese threat to ASE-
AN‘s cohesion intensified by the perception of ASEAN‘s general weakness 
and low ASEAN identity. Secondly, a threat to ASEAN‘s ability to man-
age regional stability and order which is linked to Indonesian leadership 
and high ASEAN identity. The second threat might be representative for 
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those participants that see ASEAN as more influential and powerful, and 
as a crucial platform for Indonesia to exercise power and leadership in 
the region.
Indonesian leadership and threat perceptions
The third hypothesis (H3) argues for a  link between the perception 
of a  Chinese threat and high Indonesian leadership in Southeast Asia. 
The data (table no 7) supports H3 (I with IV), but two interesting ob-
servations can be made by comparison with other correlations displayed 
on table no 7. Those between Indonesian leadership and the perception 
of a Chinese threat to 1) ASEAN cohesion (III and V) and b) Indonesia 
directly are statistically insignificant. This observation is similar to those 
made earlier (table no 5) which supported H2 (link between ASEAN identi-
ty and the perception of a Chinese threat to ASEAN), but showed, despite 
similar levels of ASEAN identity, different patterns regarding the percep-
tion of a Chinese threat to a) ASEAN cohesion and b) Indonesia‘s role as 
a regional leader.
Perception of a Chinese threat to Indonesia
H4 predicts that a  lack of trust in the  Chinese government aggra-
vates the perception of a Chinese threat to ASEAN, which is supported 
by the data (table 8). The correlation of variable II (trust in the Chinese 
government) with the two items inquiring on the perception of China’s 
negative influence on ASEAN cohesion (III and V) were particularly sig-
nificant. Correspondingly, both variables (III and V) have an equally sig-
nificant or stronger correlation with the  general perception that China 
is a threat to Indonesia (I). The data does not only support H4 but also 
indicates a link between the perception of China being a threat to ASEAN 
and immediately to Indonesia. However, no significant correlation can be 
made between the level of trust in China and the perception of a Chinese 
threat to Indonesian leadership in the region. This could imply that Chi-
na is perceived as a challenge to Indonesia‘s regional leadership, but is not 
expected to deliberately undermine this position.
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The China threat and a lack of assertiveness 
in Indonesian foreign policy
A relationship between a Chinese threat to ASEAN and/or Indonesia 
and the perception that Indonesian foreign policy lacks assertiveness was 
predicted by H5. Significant correlations occurred only with those items that 
represent a direct threat to Indonesia (table no 9). Items regarding the per-
ception of a threat to ASEAN cohesion (IV and VII with I) produced weaker 
correlations. Based on these findings we can argue that a perceived lack of 
assertiveness in Indonesian foreign policy primarily influences the percep-
tion of a direct threat to Indonesia while it appears less important regarding 
the perceived Chinese threat to ASEAN cohesion (compare to table no 11).
ASEAN’s place in Indonesian foreign policy
H6 predicts that low identification with ASEAN results in a  favour 
for a post-ASEAN foreign policy and demands for a stronger global role for 
Indonesia. If H6 was true it would mean a break with Indonesia‘s tradi-
tional foreign policy principle of “concentric circles”which bases ASEAN 
at the centre of Indonesian foreign policy. As predicted low ASEAN iden-
tity increases favouritism for a foreign policy that puts less emphasis on 
ASEAN (I with VII on table no 10). High ASEAN identity did not go hand 
in hand with a desire to focus on regional politics (I with III and VI). At 
the same time a high level of Indonesian leadership reinforces the need 
for the policy of concentric circles and Indonesia‘s regional role while si-
multaneously aspiring a global role as well. However, the correlation be-
tween II and III shows the aspiration for a stronger global role in response 
to high Indonesian leadership does not occur on the cost of Indonesia‘s 
regional role. At the same time, high levels of Indonesian leadership cor-
relate strongly with support for president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s 
(SBY) policy of “Rowing between Two Reefs“, which emphasises the need 
to balance Indonesian foreign policy between the interests and influenc-
es of China and the United States without bandwagoning with any one 
against the  other. While lower ASEAN identity results in disapproval 
of “Rowing between Two Reefs“, high Indonesian leadership reinforces 
the  importance of Indonesia‘s role to balance the  interests of the  great 
powers in the region.
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Threat perceptions and demand for a “post-ASEAN 
foreign policy“
H7 predicts that higher perceptions of a Chinese threat to ASEAN 
cause a higher demand for Indonesia to develop a  post-ASEAN foreign 
policy. Table no 12 shows high perception of a Chinese threat to ASEAN 
(I and II), relates in increasing favour for Indonesia‘s traditional foreign 
policy concept of the “concentric circles”. The same accounts for the ef-
fect of direct Chinese threats to Indonesia (I, II and III on table no 11) on 
the support for the “concentric circles”concept. Similarly, all threat related 
items on table no 11 (I, II and III) and no 12 (I, II and III) have no signif-
icant effect on a preference for a post-ASEAN foreign policy (VI on table 
no 11 and no 12).
The China threat and Indonesian foreign policy 
performance
The  final hypothesis (H8) predicts that high threat perceptions of 
China cause an increasing challenge to traditional foreign policy concepts 
in Indonesia. Similar to H5, H8 is linked to the perception of Indonesian 
foreign policy performance. In support of H5 the data (tables no 11 and no 
12) shows that a perceived lack of assertiveness only affects the perception 
of a Chinese threat to Indonesia‘s role as a regional leader (III with VIII 
on table no 12), while it has little effect on the perception of a threat to 
ASEAN (I, II and III with VIII on table no 11; I and II with VIII on table 
no 12). None of the China threat items had any significant correlation 
with approval for “Rowing between two reefs” (VII), implying that such 
approval is not much affected by  this specific threat perception. More 
significant is the relationship between the perception of a Chinese threat 
to ASEAN and the evaluation of Indonesian foreign policy as messy and 
chaotic (I and II with XII on table no 12). The opposite can be said about 
the perception of a threat to Indonesian leadership (XII and III on table 
no 12) and a perceived threat posed by China‘s rise and military modern-
isation (I, II and III with XII on table no 11). Overall, Indonesian foreign 
policy was largely regarded as far-sighted, especially in relation to the pos-
sibility that China could split ASEAN (II on table no 12) and the chal-
lenge posed to Indonesia‘s regional leadership role (III on table no 12). 
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Significant here are the correlations between the threat to ASEAN, and to 
a lesser extent the threat to Indonesian regional leadership, and the view 
that Indonesia‘s traditional bebas-aktif foreign policy is an archaic con-
cept that does not fit the 21st century (I, II and III with XV on table no 12). 
These results imply that despite a generally rather positive evaluation of 
Indonesian foreign policy in relation to the China threat, an increasing 
perception of this same threat results in a  challenge to the  traditional 
non-aligned policy. SBY‘s particular version of bebas-aktif, the  “million 
friends, zero enemies”policy, was regarded as harmful by those perceiving 
a risk that China could split ASEAN (I and II with XVI on table no 12).
Discussion
In support of H1 the statistical analysis of the data shows a strong link 
between ASEAN identity and Indonesian leadership. There is only limited 
support for the assumption of H2 that high ASEAN identity aggravates 
the  threat perception that China will split ASEAN. Quite the  opposite 
low ASEAN identity aggravates the threat perception. Hence, H2 receives 
only limited support due to the very strong link between ASEAN identity 
and Indonesian leadership on basis of the outcomes of H3. H3 predicted 
that high Indonesian leadership would result in higher threat perceptions. 
A claim that was strongly supported by the data. However, H3 is also only 
partially confirmed, because high Indonesian leadership correlates only 
weakly with threat perceptions that China will split ASEAN. On the other 
hand, it correlated strongly with perceptions of Chinese threats to Indone-
sia‘s role as a member and leader of ASEAN. Trust was a significant factor 
regarding threat perceptions (H4). A lack of trust in the Chinese govern-
ment aggravated the fear that China will split ASEAN, but was rather in-
significant to the perception that China challenges Indonesia as a regional 
leader. The opposite relationship can be observed between China threat 
and a lack of assertiveness in Indonesian foreign policy (H5). While a per-
ceived lack of assertiveness had no significant effect on the perception that 
China will split ASEAN, it intensified the perception of a Chinese threat to 
Indonesian leadership. H6 and H7 predicted that low identification with 
ASEAN (H6) and strong threat perceptions of China (H7) would result in 
approval for a post-ASEAN foreign policy. Such predictions are particular-
ly interesting in the context of SIT because favouritism for a post-ASEAN 
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foreign policy would indicate support for social mobility and the opinion 
that Indonesia deals with contemporary challenges such as the  rise of 
China by  leaving ASEAN for more powerful groups. If confirmed these 
predictions would pose serious challenges to the  claim that ASEAN is 
central to Indonesian foreign policy. Despite the fact that H6 was strongly 
supported by the data, the opposite can be said for H7. High perceptions 
of a Chinese threat reinforced the importance of ASEAN in Indonesian 
foreign policy. This went hand in hand with support for Indonesian efforts 
to manage great power rivalry in the  region. Overall, the data supports 
the dominant argument in the field that ASEAN is regarded as central to 
Indonesian foreign policy and crucial to exercise power in the region and 
to deal with great power influence. The results suggest that Indonesians 
prefer social dominance and social creativity approaches that strengthen 
ASEAN over the “exit option”. H8 gained more support from the data and 
showed an overall tendency that strong threat perceptions result in an 
increasing tendency to challenge traditional foreign policy thinking, such 
as Indonesia‘s non-aligned stance formulated by bebas-aktif and “million 
friends, zero enemies”.
Qualitative Data
The interviews conducted with diplomats and foreign policy-makers 
showed results similar to those of the quantitative survey. Although none 
of the  informants were able to answer the question of whether there is 
a common Asian identity, all agreed on the existence of an ASEAN iden-
tity. Despite their common inability to define the  binding elements of 
this identity, the majority regarded historical reasons as most important. 
(Interview by author, Jakarta, 27.11.2012). Their definitions of ASEAN 
identity clearly excluded extra-regional powers like China, which was re-
peatedly explained with the argument that even more than a decade after 
the fall of Suharto, communism is still an issue in Indonesia that influenc-
es perceptions of China. (Interview by author, Jakarta, 19.11.2012; Inter-
view by author, Bandung, 5.12.2011). Another common observation was 
that the commitment to ASEAN varies between member states, between 
old and new members in particular. According to one informant, Indone-
sia places ASEAN at the core of its foreign policy, but he expressed doubts 
that other ASEAN members, especially Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, 
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do likewise. Hence, with ASEAN identity still being ‘under construction’, 
it was difficult for informants to imagine a broader and more inclusive 
identity beyond ASEAN. (Interview by  author, Jakarta, 27.11.2012). 
The lack of unity is seen as one of the main challenges facing ASEAN. 
One informant stressed the need to develop common “benchmarks”for 
ASEAN cooperation and to increase member states’awareness of the costs 
of defection when they decide to put their own short term (national) inter-
ests above their common ASEAN interests as demonstrated by the failed 
consensus of 2012. The same informant stressed that it was in all ASE-
AN members’interest to keep ASEAN strong and, thereby, Southeast Asia 
stable and prosperous. If ASEAN failed to do so he questioned whether 
the association would be of any further use to Indonesia. (Interview by au-
thor, Jakarta, 1.02.2013.)
The same informant emphasised that benchmarking was an impor-
tant part of the AC project. After the Asian Financial Crisis when ASE-
AN members realised that global interest in the region was decreasing, 
ASEAN leaders became concerned as how to respond to the  situation. 
Identity building, primarily through the increase of communication and 
exchange within ASEAN, became a crucial aspect of the AC project. Ac-
cording to the  informant’s analysis a  stronger “we-feeling” would have 
prevented the crisis in Phnom Phen, because member states would have 
been less likely to put their national interests above common interests. 
By  successfully implementing the  ASEAN Community, the  association 
would gain a platform to better align members’interests, thus, strength-
ening ASEAN’s bargaining position. The  ASEAN Security Community 
(ASC), for example, creates a good basis for a security cooperation based 
on the  idea that security pressure faced by  a  single member is regard-
ed as a problem for the whole association. (Interview by author, Jakarta, 
1.02.2013). Another informant stressed that it is important to prioritise 
unity, solidarity and common action, which he defined as the core ideas 
behind the ASC. However, he also expressed concern that not all member 
states are at the same level of readiness to embrace this project. (Interview 
by author, Jakarta 28.11.2012). Similar to an observation made on ASE-
AN identity, a junior diplomat pointed out that while Indonesia locates 
ASEAN at the centre of its foreign policy of concentric circles and does 
its best to strengthen ASEAN cohesion, the  same may not be true for 
other states like Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. He insisted that future 
development necessitates that other members’national interests favour 
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ASEAN over outsiders, because such progress is dependent on successful 
multilateral negotiation which requires the political will of all parties in-
volved. (Interview by author, Jakarta, 27.11.2012). Statements like this 
indicate the perceived need for a strong ASEAN to face the global powers 
and outside interference as well as the need for Indonesian leadership. 
At the same time the statement is typical for those aspects of Indonesian 
diplomacy which are frequently criticised: a  tendency to bide time and 
a lack of assertiveness.
Other informants agreed on the  crucial role that ASEAN plays 
in preventing open conflict in the  region and the  positive effect on its 
members’capability to concentrate on domestic development by shifting 
attention away from the military sector. All informants were in favour 
of a strong ASEAN and saw need for continuing Indonesian leadership. 
However, here we can perceive a gap between the foreign service, the coa-
lition government members and other civil servants on the one hand and 
independent policy-advisers/experts and opposition members on the oth-
er. The later always emphasised the lack of assertiveness in Indonesian 
foreign policy. (Interviews by author, Jakarta, 17.12.2012, 13.12.2012 and 
01.02.2013; Interview by author, Bandung, 5.12.2011). A leading Indone-
sian ASEAN expert explained his view that Indonesia clearly holds a re-
gional leadership role that allows the republic to exercise power through 
ASEAN. However, he stressed that the  government lacks in leadership 
to use and fulfil this role, arguing that Indonesia could have prevented 
the (foreseeable) diplomatic deadlock in Phnom Phen by pro-actively lob-
bying for ASEAN’s common interests instead of acting as a fire extinguish-
er when it was already too late. (Interview by author, Jakarta, 17.12.2012.)
It can be argued that ASEAN’s weakness and its lack of cohesion are 
attributed to the lack of leadership within ASEAN, a position that argu-
ably could be well played by Indonesia. As one parliamentarian argued, 
Indonesia could play two crucial roles within ASEAN, one formal and one 
informal. Firstly, Indonesia should formally propose and initiate a vari-
ety of cooperation projects within the existing multilateral frameworks. 
Secondly, the  parliamentarian emphasised that Indonesia should infor-
mally stimulate constructive cooperation among the  ASEAN members 
as a  form of internal lobbying that promotes cooperation and cohesive-
ness. At the same time, this informant argued that the current Indonesian 
government lacks the leadership to play such a role which subsequently 
resulted in the gradual decline of Indonesia’s leadership role within ASE-
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AN. (Interview by  author, Jakarta, 13.12.2012). Another informant re-
plied in a similar fashion to the author’s argument that Indonesia lost its 
leadership role in the eyes of other ASEAN members: “No, they consider 
Indonesia to be the leader, accept that Indonesia has [no] leader to play 
that role” (Interview by author, Jakarta, 17.12.2012). A similar criticism 
of president SBY‘s lack of leadership was made recurrently by pointing out 
that, as a former staff general, SBY lacks the tendency to make quick and 
bold decisions that characterise a field general. (Interview by author, Band-
ung, 5.12.2011). Similar to the quantitative data the interviews showed 
a preference for social dominance and creativity instead of social mobility.
All informants agreed that the increasing influence of external pow-
ers, especially the U.S. and China, in the  region is unlikely to change; 
the  challenge is to find the  right approach to deal with these external 
powers. The fact that ASEAN was able to encourage the great powers to 
join the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) as a requirement to join 
the East Asia Summit was regarded as important for ASEAN. Such initi-
atives are seen as a way to keep ASEAN relevant and in the driving seat 
of regional multilateralism, thereby allowing its members to influence 
the emerging regional multilateral framework to their liking. (Interview 
by author, Jakarta, 17.12.2012.)
Conclusions
Despite broadening and deepening cooperation between China and 
Indonesia, threat perceptions and a lack of trust remain important factors 
in the  bilateral relationship. The  results of this study however provide 
only limited support to the argument that China’s increasing influence 
is regarded as a  threat to ASEAN’s social identity. China at best may 
be considered a symbolic rather than a real threat to ASEAN cohesion. 
Threat perceptions appear more salient regarding Indonesia’s identity as 
an active member and regional leader within ASEAN, which implies that 
the perceived threat is perceived as directed at Indonesia’s national iden-
tity as much as its social identity. The discussion on China‘s challenge 
to ASEAN is more concerned with ASEAN‘s old problem on how to deal 
with great power influence and its role as a platform for Indonesia to ex-
ercise leadership and power in the region.
Both datasets showed that participants/informants with high identifi-
cation with ASEAN perceive the association as able withstand any threat 
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of China splitting it. Instead, the problem is seen in the lack of leadership 
within the organisation, also represented in the stronger threat perception 
of China to Indonesian leadership than to ASEAN as a group. The da-
tasets imply that it is more about Indonesia developing a  stronger and 
more measured approach to secure its national interests with those of 
ASEAN‘s, by assuming a more assertive leadership role.
A leading Indonesian expert on China has argued that while China’s 
economic and political influence develops, the window of opportunity for 
ASEAN is closing. This research concludes that ASEAN is in some degree 
of danger of losing its central role in managing regional order and stabil-
ity, less so because of the influence of China or other great powers and 
more so due to the lack of action of ASEAN and its members. In 2011 
Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa opined that Indonesia would ag-
gressively wage peace in the region (Nartalegawa, 2011), however, Indone-
sia‘s foreign relations while peaceful, lack such “positive aggressiveness”. 
The  aftermath of Indonesia‘s 2014 presidential elections will show if 
the successive government will assume that role within ASEAN to ensure 
its cohesion, progress and especially its future as the manager of regional 
order and stability.
References
Acharya, A. (2009) Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and 
the Problem of Regional Order, 2nd edition, Oxon: Routledge.
Atran, S. and Axelrod, R. (2008) ‘Reframing Sacred Values’, Negotiation Journal, July, 
2008, pp. 221–246.
Bazerman, M. H., Tenbrunsel, A. and Wade-Benzoni, K. (2008) ‘When “Sacred” Issues Are 
at Stake’, Negotiation Journal, July, pp. 113–117.
Brown, R. (2000) ‘Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Fu-
ture Challenges’, European Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 30, November, pp. 745–
778.
Correll, J. and Park, B. (2005) ’A Model of the Ingroup as a Social Resource’, Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, vol. 9, no. 4, November, pp. 341–59.
Desker, B. (2010) ‘Is Indonesia Outgrowing ASEAN?’, RSIS Commentaries, no. 125, Sep-
tember, pp. 1–2.
Emmerson, D. K. (2012), ‘Beyond the six points: how far will Indonesia go?’, East Asia 
Forum, 29 Jul [Online], Available: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/07/29/beyond-
the-six-points-how-far-will-indonesia-go/ [24 Sep 2013].
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013), Indonesien [Indonesia], Available: http://www.
auswaertiges-amt.de/sid_87F2F01B3107B998CCDC19E036A667BF/DE/Aussenpo-
litik/Laender/Laenderinfos/01-Nodes_Uebersichtsseiten/Indonesien_node.html [02 
Jun 2013].
271Indonesian Perceptions of China‘s Threat to ASEAN…
Giessner, S.R. and van Knippenberg, D. (2008) ‘‘License to Fail’: Goal Definition, Lead-
er Group Prototypicality, and Perceptions of Leadership Effectiveness after Leader 
Failure’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, vol. 105, January, 
pp. 14–35.
Jackson, L. A., Sullivan, L. A., Harnish, R. and Hodge, C. N. ‘Achieving Positive Social 
Identity: Social Mobility, Social Creativity, and Permeability of Group Boundaries’, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 70, no. 2, February, pp. 241–254.
Johnston, A. I. (2001) ‘Treating International Institutions as Social Environments’, Inter-
national Studies Quarterly, vol. 45, no. 4, December, pp. 487–515.
Natalegawa, M. M. (2013) ‘Pidato Pernyataan Tahunan Menteri Luar Nederi Republik In-
donesia’ [2013 Annual Press Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Repub-
lic of Indonesia R. M. Marty M. Natalegawa] [Online], Available: http://kemlu.go.id/
Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Menteri&ID-
P=791&l=id [4 January 2013].
Nartalegawa, M. M. (2011) ‘Waging Aggressive Peace: ASEAN and the Asia Pacific‘, Stra-
tegic Review, vol. 1, no. 2, November-December, pp. 48–46.
Sebastian, L. and Lanti, I. G. (2010) ‘Perceiving Indonesian Approaches to International 
Relations Theory’, in: Acharya, A. and Buzan, B. (ed.) Non-Western International 
Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia, London: Routledge.
Severino, R. C., ‘Cambodia hosts the first ASEAN summit for 2012’, East Asia Forum, 27 
Apr [Online], Available: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/04/27/cambodia-hosts-
the-first-asean-summit-for-2012/ [23 Jul 2013].
Sukma, R. (2009) ‘Indonesia needs a post-ASEAN foreign policy’, The Jakarta Post, 30 
June [Online], Available: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/06/30/indone-
sia-needs-a-postasean-foreign-policy.html [24 September 2013].
Tajfel, H. (1969) ‘Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice’, Journal of Social Issues, vol. 25, no. 4, 
Autumn, pp. 79–97.
Tajfel, H. (1972) ‘Experiments in a vacuum’, in Israel, J. and Tajfel, H. (ed.) The Context 
of Social Psychology: A Critical Assessment, Oxford: Academic Press.
Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. C. (1979) ‘An integrative theory of intergroup conflict’, The Social 
Psychology of Intergroup Relations, vol. 33, February, pp. 1–39.
Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. C. (1986) ‘The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior’, in 
Worchel, S. and Austin, W. (ed.) Psychology of Intergroup Relations, Chicago: Nelson 
Hall.
Turner, J. C. (1982) ‘Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group’, in Henri Ta-
jfel (ed), Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Voci, A. (2006) ‘The Link between Identification and In-Group Favouritism: Effects of 
Threat to Social Identity and Trust-Related Emotions’, British Journal of Social Psy-
chology, vol. 45, June, pp. 265–284.
Welch Larson, D. and Shevchenko (2010), A. ‘Status, Identity, and Rising Powers’, CIPSS 
Working Paper, no. 32, October, pp. 1–22.
Wendt, A. (1994) ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’, The Ameri-
can Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 2, June, pp. 384–396.
